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ABSTRACT
We analyze the extent to which simple markets can be used to aggregate disperse information into
efficient forecasts of uncertain future events. Drawing together data from a range of prediction
contexts, we show that market-generated forecasts are typically fairly accurate, and that they
outperform most moderately sophisticated benchmarks. Carefully designed contracts can yield
insight into the market's expectations about probabilities, means and medians, and also uncertainty
about these parameters. Moreover, conditional markets can effectively reveal the market's beliefs
about regression coefficients, although we still have the usual problem of disentangling correlation
from causation. We discuss a number of market design issues and highlight domains in which
prediction markets are most likely to be useful.
Justin Wolfers

















In July 2003, press reports began to surface of a project within the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a research think tank within the 
Department of Defense, to establish a Policy Analysis Market that would allow trading in 
various forms of geopolitical risk.  Proposed contracts were based on indices of economic 
health, civil stability, military disposition, conflict indicators and potentially even specific 
events.  For example, contracts might have been based on questions like: “How fast will 
the non-oil output of Egypt grow next year?” or “Will the U.S. military withdraw from 
country A in two years or less?” Moreover, the exchange would have offered 
combinations of contracts, perhaps combining an economic event and a political event. 
The concept was to discover whether trading in such contracts could help to predict 
future events, and how connections between events were perceived. However, a political 
uproar followed. Critics savaged DARPA for proposing “terrorism futures,” and rather 
than spend political capital defending a tiny program, the agency dropped the proposal.
1 
Ironically, the aftermath of the DARPA controversy provided a vivid illustration 
of the power of markets to provide information about probabilities of future events. An 
offshore betting exchange, Tradesports.com, listed a new security that would pay $100 if 
the head of DARPA, Admiral John Poindexter, was ousted by the end of August 2003.  
Early trading suggested a likelihood of resignation by the end of August of 40 percent, 
and price fluctuations reflected ongoing news developments. Around lunchtime on July 
31, reports started citing credible Pentagon insiders who claimed knowledge of an 
impending resignation.  Within minutes of this news first surfacing (and hours before it 
became widely known), the price spiked to around 80.  These reports left the date of 
Poindexter’s proposed departure uncertain, which explains the remaining risk.  As 
August dragged on, the price slowly fell back toward 50.  On August 12, Poindexter then 
issued a letter of resignation suggesting that he would resign on August 29.  On the 12
th, 
the market rose sharply, closing at a price of 96. 
                                                 
1 Looney (2003) provides a useful summary of both the relevant proposal and its aftermath.  Further, Robin 
Hanson has maintained a useful archive of related news stories and government documents at: 
http://hanson.gmu.edu/policyanalysismarket.html. 2 
This anecdote describes a new—and emerging—form of financial market, often 
known as a prediction market, but also going by the name “information market” or “event 
futures.”  Analytically, these are markets where participants trade in contracts whose 
payoff depends on unknown future events. Much of the enthusiasm for prediction 
markets derives from the efficient markets hypothesis.  In a truly efficient prediction 
market, the market price will be the best predictor of the event and no combination of 
available polls or other information can be used to improve on the market-generated 
forecasts.  This statement does not require that all individuals in a market be rational, 
only that the marginal trade in the market is motivated by rational traders.  Of course, it is 
unlikely that prediction markets are literally efficient, but a number of successes in these 
markets, both within firms and with regard to public events like presidential elections, 
have generated substantial interest among both political and financial economists. 
Although markets designed specifically for information aggregation and 
revelation are our focus in this article, the line between these kinds of prediction markets 
and the full range of contingent commodities -- from stock in your company to betting on 
the Super Bowl -- can become blurry. However, we will generally lean away from 
discussing markets where the primary focus is holding or trading risk that may be 
intrinsically enjoyable, as in sports betting and other gambling markets.  We will also 
lean away from focusing on markets that are substantial enough in size to allow a 
significant extent of risk-sharing and pooling by matching risky assets with risk-acceptant 
investors, as the major financial markets do.
2  However, most contingent commodity 
markets involve some mix of risk-sharing, fun and information transmission, so these 
distinctions are not impermeable.  
We begin by describing the types of contracts that might be traded in prediction 
markets, before proceeding to survey several applications.  We then draw together a 
rough and fairly optimistic description of what we have learned from early experiments, 
raise some market design issues, and conclude with some evidence on the limitations of 
prediction markets.  
                                                 
2  For a vision of how prediction markets, if they develop sufficient liquidity, may also prove useful for 
those wishing to hedge against specific risks, see the discussions in Athanasoulis, Shiller, and van Wincoop 
(1999) and Shiller (2003). 
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2. Types of Prediction Markets 
In a prediction market, payoffs are tied to unknown future events.  The design of 
how the payoff is linked to the future event can elicit the market’s expectations of a range 
of different parameters. We will speak as though the market is itself a representative 
“person” with a set of expectations. However, the reader should be warned that there are 
important but subtle differences between, say, the market’s median expectation and the 
median expectation of market participants. 
Table 1 summarizes the three main types of contracts.  
Table 1:  Contract Types—Estimating Uncertain Quantities or Probabilities 




Event y: Al Gore 
wins the popular vote 
Contract costs $p 
Pays $1 if and only if 
event y occurs 
Bid according to 
value of $p 
 
Probability that 




Contract pays $1 for 
every percentage 
point of the popular 
vote won by Al Gore 
 
Contract pays $y. 
 
Mean value of 
outcome y: E[y] 
 
Spread  Contract pays even 
money if Gore wins 
more than y
*% of the 
popular vote. 
Contract costs $1 
Pays $2 if y>y
* 
Pays $0 otherwise. 
Bid according to the 
value of y
*. 




First, in a “winner-takes-all” contract, the contract costs some amount $p and pays 
off, say, $1 if and only if a specific event occurs, like a particular candidate winning an 
election. The price on a winner-take-all market represents the market’s expectation of the 
probability that an event will occur (assuming risk neutrality).
3 
                                                 
3  The price of a winner-takes-all security is essentially a state price, which will equal an estimate of the 
event’s probability under the assumption of risk neutrality.  The sums wagered in prediction markets are 
typically small enough that assuming that investors are not averse to the idiosyncratic risk involved seems 
reasonable.  But if the event in question is correlated with investors’ marginal utility of wealth, then 
probabilities and state prices can differ.  In what follows, we leave this issue aside and use the term 
probability to refer to risk-neutral probability. 4 
Second, in an “index” contract, the amount that the contract pays varies in a 
continuous way based on a number that rises or falls, like the percentage of the vote 
received by a candidate. The price for such a contract represents the mean value that the 
market assigns to the outcome.  
Finally, in “spread” betting traders differentiate themselves by bidding on the 
cutoff that determines whether an event occurs, like whether a candidate receives more 
than a certain percentage of the popular vote. (Another example of spread betting is 
point-spread betting in football, where the bet is either that one team will win by at least a 
certain number of points, or will not.) In spread betting, the price of the bet is fixed, but 
the size of the spread can adjust. When spread betting is combined with an even-money 
bet (that is, winners double their money while losers receive zero), the outcome can yield 
the market’s expectation of the median outcome because this is only a fair bet if a payoff 
is as likely to occur as not. 
The basic forms of these relevant contracts will reveal the market’s expectation of 
a specific parameter:  a probability, mean, or median, respectively. But in addition, 
prediction markets can also be used to evaluate uncertainty about these expectations.  For 
instance, consider a family of winner-takes-all contracts that pay off if and only if the 
candidate earns 48 percent of the vote, 49 percent, 50 percent and so on.  This family of 
winner-takes-all contracts will then reveal almost the entire probability distribution of the 
market’s expectations.  A family of spread betting contracts can yield similar insights. An 
even-money bet in a spread contract will define the median, as explained above. But for 
similar reasons, a contract that costs $4 and pays $5 if y>y
* will elicit a value of y
* that 
the market believes to be a four-fifths probability, thus identifying the 80
th percentile of 
the distribution.  As a final alternative, non-linear index contracts can also reveal more 
information about the underlying distribution.  For instance, consider a market with two 
index contracts, one which pays in a standard linear form, and another that pays 
according to the square of the index, y
2. Market prices will reveal the market’s 
expectation of E[y
2] and E[y], which can be used to make an inference about the market’s 
beliefs regarding the standard deviation of E[y], more commonly known as the standard 
error.  (Recall that the standard deviation can be expressed as √(E[y
2]-E[y]
2), or the 
square root of the mean of the squares less the square of the means.)  By the same logic, 5 
adding even more complicated index contracts can yield insight into higher order 
moments of the distribution. 
 
Applications and Evidence 
Perhaps the best-known prediction market among economists is the Iowa 
Electronic Market, run by the University of Iowa. The original Iowa experiment, run in 
1988, allowed trade in a contract that  would pay 2 ½  cents for each percentage point of 
the popular vote in the presidential election won by Bush, Dukakis, or others. More 
recently, it has run markets based on the 2003 California gubernatorial election, the 2004 
presidential election, the 2004 Democratic presidential nomination, and how the Federal 
Reserve will alter the federal funds interest rate. Universities in other countries have also 
started running event markets about their own elections, like the Austrian Electronic 
Market run by the Vienna University of Technology or the University of British 
Columbia Election Stock Market that focuses on Canadian elections.   
There are a growing number of web-based event markets, often run by companies 
that provide a range of trading and gambling services. Some prominent examples include 
Tradesports.com and Betfair.com, as well as pseudo-markets (in which participants trade 
virtual currency) such as Newsfutures.com and Ideosphere.com. These websites often 
take the lead on defining a contract (as in the example of Poindexter’s departure from 
DARPA described earlier), but then allow individuals to post their offers and to accept 
the offers of others. 
More recently, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank have launched markets on the 
likely outcome of future readings of economic statistics, including employment, retail 
sales, industrial production, and business confidence.  The Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
is planning to open a market in inflation futures.   Some event markets also forecast 
private-sector returns.  The Hollywood Stock Exchange allows people to use virtual 
currency to speculate on movie-related questions like opening-weekend performance, 
total box office returns, and who will win Oscars. In several cases, private firms have 
found innovative ways to use prediction markets as a business forecasting tool. 
Table 2 lists some of these prediction markets.  Drawing on these and other 
experiences with event markets, it is possible to start suggesting some generalizations 6 
about how prediction markets work, both in terms of their accuracy and whether arbitrage 
or market manipulation is possible. 
 
Table 2: Prediction Markets 
Market  Focus  Typical turnover on 
an event ($US) 
Iowa Electronic Markets 
<www.biz.iowa.edu/iem> 
Run by University of Iowa 
Small-scale election markets.  
Similar markets are run by:  UBC 




Tens of thousands of 
dollars 




For profit company 
Trade in a rich set of political 
futures, financial contracts, current 
events, sports and entertainment 
 
Hundreds of 
thousands of dollars 
Economic Derivatives 
<www.economicderivatives.com> 
Run by Goldman Sachs and 
Deutsche Bank 
Large-scale financial market trading 
in the likely outcome of future 
economic data releases 




For profit company 
Political, finance, current events 
and sports markets.  Also 
technology and pharmaceutical 




monthly prizes (such 
as a TV)  
Foresight Exchange 
<www.ideosphere.com> 
Non-profit research group 
Political, finance, current events, 
science and technology events 
suggested by clients. 
 
Virtual currency 
Hollywood Stock Exchange 
<www.hsx.com> 
Owned by Cantor Fitzgerald 
Success of movies, movie stars, 
awards, including a related set of 
complex derivatives and futures.  
Data used for market research. 
Virtual currency. 
 
Accuracy of Prediction Markets 
Arguably the most important issue with these markets is their performance as 
predictive tools.  In the political domain, Berg, Forsythe, Nelson, and Reitz (2001) 
summarize the evidence from the Iowa Electronic Markets, documenting that the market 
has both yielded very accurate predictions, and also outperformed large-scale polling 
organizations. 7 
Figure 1 shows data from the past four U.S. presidential elections.  The horizontal 
axis shows the number of days before the election. The vertical axis measures the average 
absolute deviation between the prices of index contracts linked to the two-party shares of 
the popular vote for each party, and actual vote shares earned in the election.  In the week 
leading up to the election, these markets have predicted vote shares for the Democratic 
and Republican candidates with an average absolute error of around 1½ percentage 
points.  By comparison, over the same four elections, the final Gallup poll yielded 
forecasts that erred by 2.1 percentage points. The graph also shows how the accuracy of 
the market prediction improves as information is revealed and absorbed as the election 
draws closer. 
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Source: Author's calculations based on data available at: www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/
Average absolute error in predicting two-party vote shares, 1988-2000
Iowa Electronic Markets: Predictive Accuracy Through Time
 
Perhaps more surprising in terms of how well prediction markets can aggregate 
information is the performance of markets at the level of the individual district.  
Typically districts are sufficiently small that there is little interest (or funding) for local 
polling, yet when Australian bookmakers started betting on district-level races, Wolfers 
and Leigh (2002) report that they were extremely accurate. 8 
That said, comparing the performance of markets with a mechanistic application 
of poll-based forecasting may not provide a particularly compelling comparison.  A more 
relevant starting point might be to compare the predictions of markets with those of 
independent analysts. For an example along these lines, consider the “Saddam Security”, 
which was a contract offered on TradeSports paying $100 if Saddam Hussein were 
ousted from power by the end of June 2003. 
Figure 2 shows that the price of this contract moved in lockstep with two other 
measures: expert opinion as shown by an expert journalist’s estimate of the probability of 
the United States going to war with Iraq; and oil prices, an obvious barometer of political 
strife in the Middle East. 




















































































Oct 1,2002 Nov 1,2002 Dec 1,2002 Jan 1,2003 Feb 1,2003 Mar 1,2003
Saddam Security: Price of contract paying $100 if Saddam is ousted by end June 2003
Saddameter: Expert assessment of the odds of war
Oil prices (WTI), right hand scale
Sources: Trade-by-trade Saddam Security data provided by Tradesports.com; Saddameter from Will Saletan's daily column in Slate.com
Risk of War in Iraq
Prediction markets, Expert opinion and Oil markets
 
In a corporate context, the Hollywood Stock Exchange predicts opening weekend 
box office success, and Figure 3 shows that these predictions have been quite accurate.  
Further, this market has been about as accurate at forecasting Oscar winners as an expert 
panel (Pennock, Lawrence, Giles and Nielsen, 2003). 9 
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HSX Market Price = Forecast Opening Take ($ million)
Line of Best Fit
Actual=Forecast
Data from 489 movies, 2000-2003.  (www.hsx.com)
Market Forecasts of Opening Weekend Box Office Take
Hollywood Stock Exchange
 
Some firms have also begun to experiment with internal prediction markets. An 
internal market at Hewlett-Packard produced more accurate forecasts of printer sales than 
did the firm’s internal processes (Chen and Plott, 2002). Ortner (1998) described an 
experiment at Siemens in which an internal market predicted that the firm would 
definitely fail to deliver on a software project on time, even when traditional planning 
tools suggested that the deadline could be met.  While the Hollywood markets have 
drawn many participants simply on the basis of their entertainment value, the HP and 
Siemens experiences suggested that motivating employees to trade was a major 
challenge.  In each case, the firms ran real money exchanges, with only a relatively small 
trading population (20-60 people), and subsidized participation in the market, by either 
endowing traders with a portfolio or matching initial deposits.  The predictive 
performance of even these very thin markets was quite striking. 
In another recent prediction market, traders in “Economic Derivatives” predict the 
likelihood that economic data released later in the week will take on specific values.   The 
traditional approach to aggregating forecasts is to simply take an average or a “consensus 10 
estimate” from a survey of 50 or so professional forecasters.  We now have data from the 
first year of operation of these markets.  
Table 3 analyzes these early outcomes, comparing average market and consensus 
forecasts of three variables: total nonfarm payrolls data released by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; retail trade data (excluding autos) released by the Bureau of the Census; and 
business confidence as measured by the Institute for Supply Management’s survey of 
manufacturing purchasing managers. The market-based predictions of these economic 
indicators are always extremely close to the corresponding “consensus” forecast, and 
hence the two estimates are highly correlated.  There are no statistically (or 
economically) meaningful differences in forecast performance – measured as either the 
correlation with actual outcomes, or in terms of average absolute forecast errors.  That 
said, this early sample is sufficiently small that precise conclusions are difficult to draw. 
 
Table 3: Predicting Economic Outcomes 
Comparing Market-Aggregated Forecasts with Consensus Surveys 















Panel A: Correlations 
Corr(Market, Consensus)  0.91  0.94  0.95 
Corr(Consensus, Actual)  0.26  0.70  0.83 
Corr(Market, Actual)  0.22  0.73  0.91 
Panel B: Mean absolute error      
Consensus 71.1  0.45    1.10 
Market (empirical)  72.2  0.46  1.07 
Market (implied expectation)  65.7  0.34  1.58 
Panel C: Standard deviation of forecast errors (Standard error of forecast) 
Consensus 99.2  0.55  1.12 
Market (empirical)  97.3  0.58  1.20 
Market (implied expectation)  81.1  0.42  1.96 
Sample size  16  12  11 
Notes:   “Market” = market-implied mean forecast from <http://www.economicderivatives.com>  
  “Consenus” = average of around 50 forecasters from <http://www.briefing.com> 
“Actual” = Preliminary estimates from original press releases (BLS, Census, ISM). 
 
Interestingly, these markets yield not just a point estimate for each economic 
indicator, but involve a menu of ten to twenty winner-takes-all contracts as to whether the 11 
indicator will take on specific values.  This family of contracts reveals an approximation 
to the full probability distribution of market expectations.  Consequently we can calculate 
the level of uncertainty surrounding specific point estimates.  That is, because the market 
prices give weight to a range of outcomes beyond the central estimate, the weight given 
to outcomes further from the central estimate yields estimates of uncertainty.  One 
measure of uncertainty is the expected absolute forecast error (although calculations 
using standard deviation provide the same qualitative results).  The market-based 
assessments of uncertainty are shown in the last line of panel B.  Comparing these 
implied expectations with outcomes in the first two rows of panel B suggests that the 
market-based assessments of uncertainty are of about the right magnitude. Finally, one 
can compare the implied standard errors of the forecasts with the reported standard errors 
of the statistics that the market is attempting to forecast.  For instance, the Census Bureau 
reports that the change in retail trade is estimated with a standard error of around 0.5 
percent, while the standard error implied by the prediction market is 0.42 percent. Taken 
literally, this suggests that the market believes that it is less uncertain about the Census 
Bureau estimate than the Census Bureau is.
4 Such results suggest either that the statistical 
agencies’ errors are predictable, that their standard error estimates are (slightly) upwardly 
biased, or that traders are overconfident. 
 
  Possibilities for Arbitrage  
Prediction markets appear to present few opportunities for arbitrage. There are 
several ways of looking for arbitrage opportunities:  whether prices for similar contracts 
can be arbitraged across different exchanges or different securities; whether predictable 
patterns in the movement of the prices allow for arbitrage; and whether arbitrageurs 
might be able to exploit predictable deviations from rationality.  
                                                 
4  A similar comparison can be made for non-farm payrolls, although the inference is less direct.  The BLS 
estimates that their final estimate of the change in non-farm payrolls has a standard error of around 64,000, 
while the preliminary estimate is more uncertain. The BLS has yet to estimate a standard error for their 
preliminary estimates, but the root mean squared error of the preliminary estimate relative to the final 
estimate is around 50,000.  If the revision to the preliminary estimate and the subsequent error in the 
revised estimate were uncorrelated, this would imply a standard error for the preliminary estimate of about 
81,500. Comparing these numbers with the average standard error of the market forecast of 81,100 suggests 
that the market is about as sure of the advance estimate as the BLS.   
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Figure 4 shows the bid and ask prices on a contract that paid $100 if 
Schwarzenegger was elected California’s governor in 2003, sampling data on bid and ask 
prices from two online exchanges every four hours.  While both sets of data show 
substantial variation, they co-move very closely, and opportunities for arbitrage (when 
the bid price on one exchange is higher than the ask on another), are virtually absent. 


























































September 16 September 23 September 30 October 7
Tradesports
World Sports Exchange
Source: Prices collected electronically every four hours by David Pennock
2003 Recall Election
Schwarzenegger to Become California Governor
 
The pricing of families of related securities tends to be internally consistent. For 
example, Figure 5 shows the prices of several securities launched by Tradesports that 
paid off if weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq by May, June, July, or 
September 2003.  Their prices moved closely together in a way that suggests that the 
prices of each contract digested similar information at close to the same time. 13 
 
Figure 5: Will Weapons of Mass Destruction be Discovered in Iraq? 
 
 
In most cases, the time series of prices in these markets does not appear to follow 
a predictable path and simple betting strategies based on past prices appear to yield no 
profit opportunities; for example, Leigh, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2003) demonstrate this 
point for the aforementioned Tradesports “Saddam Security”.  However, there is also 
some evidence that this small-scale market responded to news about Iraq with a slight lag 
relative to deeper financial markets.  Tetlock (2004) surveys a wide range of data from 
Tradesports, finding that their financial contracts are largely priced efficiently. 
Prediction markets do seem to display some of the deviations from perfect 
rationality that appear in other financial markets.  There is substantial evidence from 
psychology and economics suggesting that people tend to overvalue small probabilities 
and undervalue near certainties.  For example, there is a well-known “favorite-longshot 
bias” in horse races (for example, discussed in this journal by Thaler and Ziemba, 1988), 
in which bettors tend to overvalue extreme longshots and thus receive much lower returns 14 
for such bets, an effect which is offset by somewhat higher (albeit still negative) returns 
for betting on favorites.  The “volatility smile” in options refers to a related pattern in 
financial markets (Bates, 1991; Rubenstein, 1994), which involves over-pricing of 
strongly out-of-the-money options, and under-pricing of strongly in-the-money options 
(relative to their future values or their ex-ante values from the Black-Scholes option 
pricing formula).
5  These experiences suggest that it is likely that prediction markets will 
also perform poorly at predicting small probability events. 
A somewhat vivid example of this kind of miscalibration comes from financial 
variables that trade on Tradesports.  Table 4 reports the bid and ask prices in the 
prediction market for a contract that will pay $100 if the Standard and Poor’s 500 index 
finishes 2003 in a certain range.  For comparison, one can look at the actual prices of 
December S&P options traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  We used the 
method discussed in Leigh, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2003) to translate the financial 
market prices into prices for a security comparable to the Tradesports contract. 
Comparing Tradesports prices with the actual option prices in Chicago suggests that the 
extremely unlikely (high and low) outcomes for the S&P 500 are relatively over-priced 
on Tradesports.  In fact, the price differences implied a (small) arbitrage opportunity that 
persisted for most of summer 2003 and has reappeared in 2004.  Similar patterns existed 
for Tradesports securities on other financial variables like crude oil, gold prices, and 
exchange rates. This finding is consistent with the longshot bias being more pronounced 
on smaller-scale exchanges.  
 
                                                 
5  Aït-Sahalia, Wang, and Yared (2001) argue that the conclusion of miscalibration is less clear cut in this 
context because these prices may be driven by small likelihoods of extreme price changes. 
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Table 4: Price of Standard and Poor’s Future Price Securities 
Tradesports vs. Actual Prices from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange  
  Price on Tradesports   
 
 











1200 and over  2  6  2.5 
1100 to 1199  11  16  13.2 
1000 to 1099  28  33  33.3 
900 to 999  25  30   30.5 
800 to 899  14  19  13 
700 to 799  3  8  5 
600 to 699  4  7  2 
Under 600  5  8  1 
S&P level on July 23, 2003  985 
Notes:   Prices are market close, July 23, 2003.  Prices given in first two columns are for a security that 
pays $100 if S&P finishes 2003 in given range. Prices in third column are estimated from actual option 
settlement prices using the method in Leigh, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2003), adjusting for the 13 day 
difference in expiry date. 
 
Another behavioral bias reflects the tendency of market participants to trade 
according to their desires, rather than their objective probability assessments.  Strumpf 
(2004) provides evidence that certain New York gamblers are more likely to bet on the 
Yankees, while Forsythe, Reitz and Ross (1999) provide evidence that individual traders 
buy and sell in political markets in a manner correlated with their party identification.  
Even so, as long as marginal trades are motivated by profits rather than partisanship, 
prices will reflect the assessments of (unbiased) profit motive.  Thus far there is little 
evidence that these factors yield systematic unexploited profits.  (For instance, 
systematically betting either for or against the New York Yankees during the 1990s 
would have yielded losses in either case.) 
  A further possible limitation of prediction market pricing arises if speculative 
bubbles drive prices away from their likely outcomes.  Traditional markets may be 
subject to bubbles because of constraints on short selling and because investors will be 
reluctant to commit a large share of their wealth to an arbitrage opportunity, since if the 
mispricing does exist, it may get worse before it gets better (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Since prediction markets typically impose no restrictions on short selling, and the 
markets are sufficiently small-scale that it is unlikely that informed investors will be 16 
capital-constrained, the scope for bubbles might be more limited. It is almost impossible 
to make any serious attempt at describing the frequency of bubbles in the data we have so 
far.  However, through September 2003 we suspected a bubble in the Tradesports 
security on whether Hillary Clinton would win the Democratic nomination.  Our 
suspicions were based on her public statements that she was not a candidate, and the 
tenor of discussion among traders, which seemed to indicate that trading was being 
driven by expectations of future price movements rather than by fundamentals.  Equally, 
these high prices may have reflected betting from those with access to campaign insiders 
who knew more about her state of mind than we did. 
Empirically, the best that we can say is that the performance of past markets at 
predicting the future has been, on average, pretty good, whether or not specific markets 
were in some cases distorted by biases or bubbles. Laboratory experiments hold out the 
possibility of learning more about bubbles, as it is possible for the experimenter to know 
the “true price,” and hence to observe deviations.  Plott and Sunder (1982 and 1988) have 
set up extremely stylized examples in which bubble-like behavior occurs in simple 
prediction markets.  At the same time, bubbles in experimental markets often burst and 
give way to more rational pricing. 
 
Can Event Markets Be Easily Manipulated?  
The profit motive has usually proven sufficient to ensure that attempts at 
manipulating these markets were unsuccessful.  There have been several known attempts 
at manipulation of these markets, but none of them had much of a discernible effect on 
prices, except during a short transition phase.
6 For example, Wolfers and Leigh (2002) 
report candidates betting on themselves at long odds to create a “buzz”, while 
Strumpf (2004) placed random $500 bets on the Iowa Electronic Markets to trace their 
effect. In a similar vein, Camerer (1998) attempted with little effect to manipulate betting 
on horse races by canceling large wagers at the last moment.  Clearly the extent to which 
markets are manipulable depends – at least in part – on how thin the markets are. 
                                                 
6  Rhode and Strumpf document that attempts at manipulation in early twentieth century political markets 
were typically unsuccessful. 17 
  It was feared that the DARPA markets would create the opportunity for a terrorist 
to profit from an act of terrorism or an assassination.  This concern may have been 
misplaced, both because the proposed markets were unlikely to have included terrorism 
or assassination contracts in the first place, and because the small scale of these markets 
means that terrorists would not have been able to earn much relative to the presumed 
going rate for an assassination.  An alternative view holds that such trade is actually a 
good thing to the extent that trading ultimately reveals previously secret information 
about the intentions of terrorist groups.  That said, if terrorists are sophisticated enough to 
place bets in futures markets, surely they can do so with standard futures contracts on oil 
prices, by selling short stock in insurance companies or the entire stock market, and the 
like.  Indeed, rumors have circulated widely that there was unusual trading in options on 
United and American Airlines stock in the week prior to the attacks of September 11, 
2001.  A careful analysis by Poteshman (2004) found little evidence to support these 
rumors, suggesting that if terrorists did profit from their actions, they neither left a 
noticeable footprint nor needed a prediction market to do so. 
 
3. Market Design 
The success of prediction markets, like any market, can depend on their design 
and implementation. Some of the key design issues include how buyers are matched to 
sellers, the specification of the contract, whether real money is used, and whether a 
diversity of information exists in a way that provides a basis for trading. We consider 
these in turn.   
In most prediction markets, the mechanism that matches buyers to sellers is a 
continuous double-auction, with buyers submitting bids and sellers submitting asking 
prices, and with the mechanism executing a trade whenever the two sides of the market 
reach a mutually agreeable price.  However, the new prediction markets in 
announcements of economic statistics operate more like the parimutuel systems that are 
common in horse-race betting. In a parimutuel system, all of the money that is bet goes 
into a common pot and is then divided among the winners (after subtracting transaction 
costs). Many prediction markets are also augmented by market makers who announce 
willingness to buy and sell at a certain range of prices; similarly, most sports bets are 18 
placed with bookmakers who post prices.  Finally, while these mechanisms are relatively 
useful for simple markets, Hanson (2003) has proposed the use of market scoring rules to 
allow for simultaneous predictions over many combinations of outcomes.  Instead of 
requiring separate markets for each combination of possible outcomes, traders effectively 
bet that the sum of their errors over all predictions will be lower. 
For a prediction market to work well, contracts must be clear, easily understood, 
and easily adjudicated.  For example, we don’t see contracts like “Weapons of Mass 
Destruction are not in Iraq,” but rather contracts specifying whether such weapons will 
have been found by a certain date. This requirement for clarity can sometimes turn out to 
be complex. In the 1994 U.S. Senate elections, the Iowa markets proposed what looked to 
be a well-specified market, with contracts paying according to the number of seats won 
by each party.  The day after the election (and while votes were still being counted in 
some jurisdictions), Senator Richard Shelby (D-Alabama) switched sides to become a 
Republican.  As another example, in the course of Ortner’s (1998) internal prediction 
market on whether a software project would be delivered to the client on schedule, the 
client changed the deadline. 
One intriguing question is how much difference it makes whether prediction 
markets are run with real money or with some form of play-money. Legal restrictions on 
gambling have led some groups like NewsFutures.com to adopt play-money exchanges, 
with those who amass the largest play-fortunes eligible for prizes.  Prices on play and 
real-money exchanges are not linked by arbitrage: in August 2003, for example, 
George W. Bush was a 67 percent favorite to win reelection on real-money exchanges, 
but was a 50-50 bet on NewsFutures.  However, we do not yet have sufficient 
comparative data to know the extent to which money makes predictions more accurate. 
Indeed, it has been argued that the play-money exchanges may even outperform real-
money exchanges because “wealth” can only be accumulated through a history of 
accurate prediction. In a suggestive experiment, Servan-Schreiber, Wolfers, Pennock and 
Galebach (2004) compared the predictive power of the prices from real-money and play-
money exchanges over the 2003 NFL football season, finding that both yielded 
predictions that were approximately equally accurate.  Interestingly, both sets of prices 
also outperformed all but a dozen of 3,000 people in an online contest, and also easily 19 
outperformed the average assessments of these “experts.”  One practical advantage of 
play money contracts is that they offer more freedom to experiment with different kinds 
of contracts. On play-money exchanges, such as Foresight Exchange, one often sees quite 
loosely worded “contracts” such as that a “scientific study will conclude that astrology is 
a statistically significant predictive method to describe an individual’s personality traits.” 
Even well-designed markets will fail unless a motivation to trade exists.
7  Most 
prediction markets are not large enough to allow hedging against specific risks.  
However, the play-money exchanges and sports gambling industry both suggest that it 
may be possible to motivate (small-scale) trading simply through the thrill of pitting 
one’s judgment against others, and being able to win a monetary prize may sharpen this 
motivation. Trade also requires some disagreement about likely outcomes.  Disagreement 
is unlikely among fully rational traders with common priors.  It is more likely to occur 
when traders are overconfident in the quality of their private information or in their 
ability to process public information or when they have priors that are sufficiently 
different to allow them to agree to disagree. 
These insights suggest that some prediction markets will work better when they 
concern events that are widely discussed, since trading on such events will have higher 
entertainment value and there will be more information on whose interpretation traders 
can disagree.  Ambiguous public information may be better in motivating trade than 
private information, especially if the private information is concentrated, since a cadre of 
highly informed traders can easily drive out the partly informed, repressing trade to the 
point that the market barely exists.  Indeed, attempts to set up markets on topics where 
there are insiders with substantial information advantages have typically failed.  For 
instance, the Tradesports contracts on the next Supreme Court retirement or the future of 
the papacy have generated very little trade despite the inherent interest in these questions.  
Trade can also be subsidized either directly, or indirectly by adding noise trades into the 
market, which provides the potential to profit from trading. 
Finally, the power of prediction markets derives from the fact that they provide 
incentives for truthful revelation, they provide incentives for research and information 
                                                 
7  The inflation futures market on the Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange is a case in point; this market 
generated little volume, ultimately failing. 20 
discovery, and the market provides an algorithm for aggregating opinions.  As such, 
these markets are unlikely to perform well when there is little useful intelligence to 
aggregate, or when public information is selective, inaccurate, or misleading.  Further, 
the weights that markets give to different opinions may not be an improvement on 
alternative algorithms where the accuracy of pundits is directly observable.  For example, 
the public information on the probability of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq appears 
to have been of dubious quality, so it is perhaps unsurprising that both the markets were 
as susceptible as general public opinion to being misled. 
 
4. Making Inferences from Prediction Markets 
 
How might economists use the results from prediction markets in subsequent 
analysis? The most direct form of inference involves using these predictions directly.  For 
instance, in their experiments at Hewlett-Packard, Chen and Plott (2002) elicited 
expectations of future printer sales, which were of direct interest for internal planning 
purposes. 
Some analyses have tried to link the time series of expectations elicited in 
prediction markets with time series of other variables. For instance, in Leigh, Wolfers, 
and Zitzewitz (2003), we interpreted movements in the Saddam Security as an index for 
the risk of war, and interpreted the comovement with the oil price shown in Figure 2 as a 
causal relationship, concluding that war led to a $10 per barrel increase in oil prices.  A 
similar analysis suggested that equity prices had built in a 15 percent war discount.  
Applying a similar methodology, Slemrod and Greimel (1999) linked the price of a Steve 
Forbes security in the 1996 Republican primary market with a rising interest rate 
premium on municipal bond prices because Forbes’s signature issue was a “flat tax” that 
would have eliminated the tax exemption for municipal bond interest. As with any 
regression context, one must be cautious before inferring that these correlations reflect 
causation, and must consider the issues of reverse causation, omitted variables, statistical 
significance, functional form, and the like.  
It seems quite possible to design prediction market contracts so that they would 
bring out the connection between an event and other variables. For instance, in 2002 we 21 
could have floated two securities, one paying $P if Saddam were ousted in a year (where 
P is the future oil price), with the purchase price refunded otherwise, and another that 
paid $P if Saddam remains in power, again refunding the purchase price.  The difference 
in the equilibrium price of these two securities can be interpreted as the market’s 
expectation of the effect of ousting Saddam on oil prices.  This inference does not require 
researchers to wait until sufficient variation in the political situation has accrued for a 
regression to be estimated.  Moreover, changes in the market’s beliefs about how ousting 
Saddam would affect oil prices can be directly measured through such a conditional 
market. 
Very few of these contingent markets have been constructed, though this year’s 
Iowa Electronic Market on the 2004 presidential election is instructive.  Table 5 shows 
the prices of a series of contracts which are standard index contracts that pay a penny for 
each percentage of the two-party popular vote won by each party, but are contingent in 
that the contract pays out only if the democratic nominee is also successfully predicted.  
These contracts pay nothing if the nominee is not correctly predicted. 
 
Table 5: Contingent Markets: 2004 Presidential Election 


































John Kerry  $0.344  $0.342  68.6%  50.1% 
John Edwards  $0.082  $0.066  14.8%  55.4% 
Howard Dean  $0.040  $0.047  8.7%  46.0% 
Wesley Clark  $0.021  $0.025  4.6%  45.7% 
Other Dems  $0.015  $0.017  3.2%  46.9% 
Notes: Columns A and B show the prices of contracts that pay a penny for each percentage of the two-party 
popular vote won by Democrats or Republicans respectively, conditional on picking the winner of the 
Democratic nomination.  (Contracts pay $0 if the selected candidate does not win the Democratic 
nomination.) 
Source: Closing prices as of January 29, 2004, Iowa electronic markets.   
 
Because the Democratic and Republican shares of the two-party vote must sum to 
one, a portfolio containing contracts tied to both the Democratic and Republican vote 22 
shares, but conditional on Kerry winning the nomination, will definitely pay $1 if Kerry 
wins the primary, and $0 otherwise.  Implicitly then, this market embeds a winner-takes-
all market on the Democratic primary race, and adding the prices shown in columns A 
and B yields the prices of these synthetic securities that represent the probability that any 
specific candidate wins the Democratic nomination (shown in column C).  The final 
column calculates the implied expected vote share for each candidate, if that candidate 
were to win the nomination, by deflating the cost of the Democratic vote share contract 
conditional on that candidate by the probability of that candidate actually winning the 
nomination.  Hanson (1999) has called these contingent markets “decision markets”, 
arguing that these expectations should be used to guide decision-making.  As such, 
delegates to the Democratic convention interested in selecting the strongest candidate 
would simply compare the ratios in the final column and accordingly vote for John 
Edwards.  Berg and Reitz (2003) make a related argument using data from the 1996 
Republican nomination race. 
While we are optimistic that these data on contingent prediction markets can be 
used to inform decision-making, some care is required.  In making statements about the 
comovement of two variables, social scientists have long struggled to distinguish 
correlation from causation, and these decision markets do not resolve this issue. 
One could imagine that traders hold a frequentist view of probability and that they 
price the securities in Table 5 by simply inventing hundreds of possible scenarios, and 
prices simply reflect average outcomes across these scenarios.  An econometrician 
running regressions based on these hundreds of scenarios would note a robust correlation 
between Edwards winning the nomination and the Democrats winning the presidency.  
But a careful econometrician would be reluctant to infer causation, noting that there are 
important “selection effects” at play, as the scenarios in which Edwards wins the 
nomination are not random. For example, the markets may believe that Edwards will not 
win the nomination unless Southern Democrats become energized, but if this does 
happen, it is likely that Edwards will win both the nomination and the presidency.  
Alternatively, with Kerry viewed as the likely nominee, Edwards may be perceived as a 
possible nominee only if he shows himself to be a politician of extraordinary ability, 
overcoming Kerry’s early lead in the delegate count.  If so, it also seems likely that a 23 
candidate of such extraordinary ability would win the general election.  Or Edwards 
might be perceived as thin-skinned, and likely to drop out of the race if it appears that the 
Democratic party is unlikely to win the White House.  As such, the relatively high price 
of the Edwards-Democratic security may reflect either something about Edwards’ ability 
or the selection effects that lead him to win the nomination. 
Just as econometricians often deal with selection effects by adding another 
equation that explicitly models the selection process, there is a prediction market analogy 
- floating another contract that prices the variables driving the selection of Democratic 
candidates.  For example, adding a contract that pays off if a candidate drops out of the 
nomination race early would allow an assessment of the extent to which prices of 
contingent contracts are being driven by that specific selection mechanism, thereby 
yielding a more accurate indication of candidate ability.  But since many key traits of 
candidates may be unobservable or difficult to capture in a contract that would attract 
trading, it may be impossible to rely fully on contingent markets to guide voters to the 
candidate with the greatest vote-winning potential.
8 
These relatively simple contingent markets, as well as more complex 
combinatorial markets, are as yet virtually untested and remain a useful focus for further 
research.  There may be important and interesting applications in domains where 
selection problems are minimal. 
 
5. Innovative Future Applications? 
  Prediction markets are extremely useful for estimating the market’s expectation of 
certain moments. Simple market designs can elicit expected means or probabilities, more 
complex markets can elicit variances, and contingent markets can be used to elicit the 
market’s expectations of covariances and correlations, though as with any estimation 
context, further identifying assumptions are required before a causal interpretation can be 
made. The research agenda on these markets has reflected an interplay between theory, 
experiments, and field research, drawing on scholars from economics, finance, political 
                                                 
8 Furthermore, it is worth noting that the incentives to manipulate a contract rise with its use in decision 
making, and the apparent failure of  past manipulation attempts mentioned above do not guarantee that it 
would fail in this context.  24 
science, psychology, and computer science.  This research program has established that 
prediction markets provide three important roles: 1) incentives to seek information; 
2) incentives for truthful information revelation;  and 3) an algorithm for aggregating 
diverse opinions.  Current research is only starting to disentangle the extent to which the 
remarkable predictive power of markets derives from each of these forces. 
Prediction markets doubtlessly have their limitations, but they may be useful as a 
supplement to the other relatively primitive mechanisms for predicting the future like 
opinion surveys, politically appointed panels of experts, hiring consultants, or holding 
committee meetings.  We are already seeing increasing interest in these markets in the 
private sector, with the experiments at Hewlett-Packard now being supplemented with 
new markets on pharmaceuticals and the likely success of future technologies on 
NewsFutures. 
DARPA’s ill-fated attempt at establishing a Policy Analysis Market ultimately 
failed. However, it seems likely that private-sector firms will continue to innovate and to 
create new prediction markets, so policymakers will still be able to turn to prediction 
markets run by firms like Tradesports, Net Exchange, Incentive Markets and 
NewsFutures.  It may be a sensible political outcome to have these event markets run by 
publicly-regulated, private-sector firms.  Nonetheless, to the extent that the valuable 
information generated by trade in these markets is not fully internalized into the profits 
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